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I. Introduction
Somalia’s 2017 presidential election was billed as an opportunity for
hope in a country that has not had a viable government able to broadcast power across the country for over 25 years. Though it was far from
the one person, one vote election initially promised – reportedly on
account of the parlous security situation - it did produce unexpected
and (to some) welcome results.1 The victory of Mohamed Abdullahi
Mohamed, known popularly as “Farmajo”, was welcomed with dancing and demonstrations of pleasure from the streets of Mogadishu’s to
Jijiga in neighboring Ethiopia and Garissa in next-door Kenya. Farmajo’s populist rhetoric, sprinkled with anti-Ethiopian invective and
promises for jobs and peace in Somalia resonated with a number of
Somali citizens. Yet Somalia’s election results also demonstrated structural factors that are potentially less welcome – factors that Farmajo
and his allies appear to have been influenced by and were able to
exploit. First, Somalia’s recent election, particularly the run-up to the
election finally held in February 2017 (after multiple postponements),
demonstrated the number of foreign actors with a stake in Somalia’s
future is growing and changing as is the amount of foreign influence
and its limits in Somali politics. Second, the election showed just how
reviled and discredited the previous presidential administration of
Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud had become. Third, the results display the
amount of foreign influence in Somali domestic politics and therefore the limits of Farmajo’s (or any other SFG president’s) mandate, to
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include the ability to chart a truly independent policy agenda. Fourth,
the elections demonstrated that foreign money exercised a critical factor in electoral success, but that the choice of candidate was in some
senses predicated by the demands of the “Somali street.”
II. Background
In mid-2016, a vote resulting in the election of a relative outsider as
president of the Somalia Federal Government (SFG) appeared next to
impossible. In this not-so-distant past, all bets were that then-President
Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was almost certain to win. This was not
necessarily because he had been a particularly able or effective leader.
Indeed, the rosy prognostications that accompanied his election in
2012 largely came to naught.2 Nor was Hassan Sheikh popular. Rather,
the money was on him because he had proved particularly adept in
exploiting and expanding the levers of power and reach of state intimidation at his disposal. Additionally, Hassan Sheikh was able to rely on
the firm political and financial support of key foreign backers as well
as exploit the fact that his major electoral opponents were themselves
weak, discredited or both. Indeed, if the election had been held as
initially scheduled in mid-2017, Hassan Sheikh would have almost certainly been reelected for six reasons:
1. Lack of credible or viable opposition candidates
2. The size of Hassan Sheikh’s election war chest
3. Hassan Sheikh’s ability to broadcast power through the
use of force and intimidation
4. Hassan Sheikh’s financial support from Turkey, financial
and political support from the UK, and political support
from Ethiopia
5. Clumsy political machinations of various states or their
corresponding inability to locate a viable opposition candidate
acceptable to the “Somali street”
6. A neutral or disinterested United States
In the lead up to the election, one article reported, “More than 20 presidential hopefuls are running. Analysts contend that President [Hassan
Sheikh] Mohamud has a good chance of keeping his office because
he has received millions of dollars from Turkey and the United Arab
Emirates to buy enough votes from the Parliament members who will
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vote for a new president. Turkey, the analysts said, has invested millions in Mogadishu’s port and airport.”3 Additionally, “… the Emirates
and Qatar are backing different candidates here in a rivalry over the
Muslim Brotherhood, while Egypt and Ethiopia are supporting different candidates because of their duel over the Nile.”4 While capturing
the complexity and number of international actors, the analysis simplified and therefore misconstrued the true fault lines and rivalries at
play in Somalia’s presidential election.
This article focuses on six states which attempted to influence the
outcome of the 2017 Somalia presidential elections, only one of which
is located in the Horn of Africa. Additionally, the article mentions
the role of the United States of America (US), but only insofar as it
remained a disinterested actor with the potential to have played a
significant role had the domestic situation in the US been different.
Importantly, for reasons of time and space, this article does not broach
the role played by major international organizations such as the United
Nations (UN) or bodies within the UN such as the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), all of which continue to be powerful political
and economic actors in Somalia. It also does not take into account the
relatively important military and political role of Kenya given uncertainty over Nairobi's true interests vis-à-vis the 2017 presidential candidates. Lastly, it only briefly mentions formerly powerful political
actors in Somalia such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia which appear, for
the time being, to have shifted their focus elsewhere; Egypt to its internal political situation and Saudi Arabia to Yemen and its domestic
situation.
This article subscribes to the oft-proved theory that states have
interests and those generally revolve around power, both the projection of power as well as the maintenance thereof; its loss and/or gain.
A necessary follow-on to this is the idea that states often intervene in
the affairs of other states in order to balance or hedge their interests
and, ideally, to gain power and influence within that state. The list of
states attempting to influence the outcome of elections, democratic or
not, ranges from the United States in Chile in 1964, to Russia in the
2016 US elections, to Qatar in Egypt’s 2011 Arab Spring revolution
and the election of the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate Mohammed
Morsi as president in 2012. Various schools of international relations
thought attempt to explain the motivation for external involvement
in elections in vastly different ways.5 For some, it is driven simply by
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an attempt to gain influence within that state as a means of increasing
power relative to other external actors. Others, however, point to more
ideational motives, such as preference for the political stance of a particular candidate. This was likely the case in Qatar’s and Turkey’s overt
support for Mohammed Morsi in Egypt during his brief tenure. Which
side an external actor chooses to support is unlikely to be devoid of
self-interest, even if assistance is veiled in the language of democracy
promotion. The case of US involvement in Nicaragua in 2006 is instructive, for example. When states choose to engage in such behavior and
when is the subject of much debate. However, what is not in question
is that states do engage in this behavior.
In the case of Somalia’s presidential election, the plethora of state
actors attempting to influence it sets it apart from say US engagement
in Chile or Russian attempts to influence the US elections. A second
differentiator is the fact that the most influential actors turned out to
be small or medium rising powers such as Turkey, the UAE or Qatar.
Thirdly, these states’ actions tended to displace or usurp the influential roles played by other small-to-medium powers such as Egypt and
Saudi Arabia, which had held sway in Somalia since the 1970s. Lastly,
states such as Turkey and Qatar played roles that displaced arguably
more powerful actors with a longer history of engagement in Somalia
such as the US and the UK. However, this is not necessarily indicative
of long-term change and was more the result of disinterest or lack of
salience of this election in Washington DC and, to a lesser degree, in
London, as discussed in greater detail below.
What is important to understand prior to a discussion of external actors and their role and rationale for influencing the election is
that their engagement in Somalia may be viewed, for the most part,
from the vantage point of emerging power diplomacy. Diplomacy and
recognition play central roles in the conventional conferral of state
legitimacy and functioning of the inter-state system. They focus on
sovereignty and legitimacy; the diplomatic relationships fostered as
well as the institutions of diplomacy constructed; and the strategic
position of such diplomacy vis-à-vis the conventional state-system.6
Andrew Cooper and Dennis Flemes focus on specific riddles about the
foreign policy strategies of emerging powers like Turkey. While they
focus heavily on Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (the
BRICS), they attempt to also provide answers to whether the preference of emerging powers is to utilize established institutions or to use
parallel and/or competitive mechanisms. The authors also look at the

23

ȲȲǯȱŗŞ

balance between material interests, status-enhancement, and identity
issues as motivators for policy preferences.7 In the case of Turkey, its
actions in Somalia may largely be explained by its interest in accruing
political capital in the form of international prestige. These developed
organically and were most likely unintended outcomes, at least initially, in what was at first a humanitarian mission, as demonstrated
below.8
III. Genesis of Power and Intimidation
A splinter group from al Islah (the Somali branch of the Muslim Brotherhood), Damul Jadiid (new blood) reportedly worked behind the
scenes to elect Hassan Sheikh, an obscure and largely unknown local
academic, in 2012.9 They were helped in this effort by Qatari money,
reportedly secured by Fahad Yasin Tahir, formerly a member of religiously militant Al-Itihad Al-Islami (AIAI), and the Chief of Staff for
President Farmajo.10
After his election, Hassan Sheikh and his Damul Jadiid allies sidelined Fahad Yasin (and Fahad's protégé, Farmajo) and cemented their
hold on power and monopoly on the use of force and government by
assuming key posts in the SFG. These reportedly included the ministries of justice, interior and the minister of state for the presidency.11
By actively being able to utilize the forces at his disposal – his powerful kin (Hawiye), the military, the intelligence services, the treasury
and Damul-Jadid - the president was by far the most powerful Somali
political stakeholder to contest the 2017 presidential race. Furthermore,
he was the incumbent – a factor that should have worked for him but,
given his track record in power, may have ultimately worked against
his reelection chances given anger and frustration on the street and in
the diaspora over corruption, mismanagement and paltry economic
growth.
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Figure 1: President Hassan Sheikh waters the dying tree of Somalia
with the blood of Somalis. Source: Adapted from Amin Arts
by Amin Amir: http://www.aminarts.com/

IV. The Opposition
Until mid-January 2017, the Somali electorate faced a choice between
a corrupt current president, Hassan Sheikh; a corrupt and discredited ex-president, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed; and a corrupt prime
minister, Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke. This list of choices arguably favored the chances of a viable opposition candidate or pool of
contenders who would then nominate a titular candidate. However,
Somalia’s stakeholders, both in-country and the diaspora, appeared
unable to coalesce around or support a particular candidate. That a relative outsider, Farmajo was able to ride a late wave of support had less
to do with his populism, clean hands and apparent popularity than
with an understanding that none of the other candidates, to include
then-President Hassan Sheikh, were viable as the face of a new Somali
government – both internally and externally - on account of reportedly
massive corruption and mismanagement.12 There was a palpable sense
of anger on the streets of Mogadishu and other major towns and cities
in Somalia.13 There was also a sense of disenchantment among many
in the substantial diaspora communities in London, Toronto and Minneapolis that was informed as much by clan affiliation and politics as
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by frustration at Hassan Sheikh’s reported penchant of being swayed
to whichever side offered the most money.14
V. Election Funding
Anger on the street and amongst the large diaspora was aggravated as
the 2017 presidential election campaign became marred by repeated
allegations of vote buying.15 In a report issued just prior to the election,
Marqaati, a Somali corruption watchdog claimed, “The main contenders for the presidency, including the incumbent, Hassan Sheikh, stated
that they plan to fight corruption if elected. This is however contradicted by their actions as all are planning to use substantial amounts
of money to bribe MPs.”16 Payments of reportedly $500-$1000 were
made by various presidential candidates to Somali MPs in order to
acquire the 20 signatures of MPs required to be listed as a presidential
candidate.17
Once this hurdle was cleared, another round of vote buying got
underway, with votes for presidential candidates reportedly costing
anywhere from $50K-$100K depending on the influence of the MP. But
it seems that while many MPs were willing to take money from Hassan Sheikh and consider voting for him, their voting options remained
open until the last minute given the possibility that another bribe may
have been on offer.18
This last sentence is crucial to understanding what transpired on
February 8, 2017 in Mogadishu. That is, even though Hassan Sheikh
had a sizeable reelection war chest at his disposal he was unable to
ensure that his bribes resulted in the needed votes to confirm his
reelection. It certainly was not for lack of funds. In power since 2012,
Hassan Sheikh necessarily had access to the significant resources available to residents of Villa Somalia, the presidential building in Mogadishu. Additionally, he had inked some lucrative tenders, making friends
and enemies (inside and outside Somalia) in the process. Foremost
among these were the contracts for the running and operation of Mogadishu’s international airport and the Port of Mogadishu. Both of these
were awarded to Turkish companies with strong ties to the AK Party
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢¢ȱ Âǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
the airport and port are estimated to run anywhere between $11 and
$20 million, per month.19 Turkey and Turkish companies have been
commended for competently upgrading and successfully operating
this critical infrastructure. And while the exact figures flowing to Villa
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Somalia are uncertain, under the terms of the 20-year port agreement
between Turkish firm Al-Bayrak and the Somalia Federal Government
(SFG) of Hassan Sheikh, 55% of revenue generated at the seaport will
go to the SFG and the remaining 45% to Al-Bayrak.20 This represents
the major source of non-aid revenue for the SFG, thus underscoring
and enhancing Turkey’s critical influence and behind-the-scenes political power in Mogadishu.
None of the opposition candidates running against the president, to
include those who appeared to be his closest rivals had access, at least
initially, to even a fraction of this revenue stream. Yet Hassan Sheikh
did lose the election. In order to understand why, an exploration of
pivotal states and their attempts to influence the election is in order.
VI. Turkey
Turkey maintained a stance of strict public neutrality during the period
leading up to Somalia’s presidential election. But Turkey is a powerful
political actor in Somalia. Since 2011, Turkey has made Somalia a major
focus of its foreign policy and its presence in Somalia certainly embodies one of the most interesting, but widely misunderstood regional
geopolitical developments in the past decade.
Genuine humanitarian concerns, at least initially, drove Turkey’s
engagement in efforts to alleviate a widespread and devastating
famine in 2011-2012.21 The prospect of economic gain has played an
equally important role in Turkey’s developing relationship with Somalia. In the six years spanning 2011-2017, Turkey moved from being an
economic footnote in Somalia to its fifth-biggest source of imports.22
Turkey’s engagement has been unique in that it is tangible and lasting
in the form of hospitals, schools and roads.23 Less tactile forms of aid
such as scholarships, training and diplomatic efforts aimed at fostering
political dialogue are targeted, coordinated from Ankara, and largely
unilateral in nature.24
As Turkey’s initial investments and efforts for influence in Somalia
paid off in the form of infrastructure contracts, to include Mogadishu’s international airport and its seaport.25 Turkey’s control of Somalia’s most critical and lucrative infrastructure along with its substantial
humanitarian aid necessarily make Turkey an important political actor
in Somalia because of the leverage over, and relationship it has, with
the SFG.26 Turkey’s clout has only grown with the October 2017 opening of a military training facility in Mogadishu.27 This will reportedly
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train up to 22,000 members of the Somali National Army and potentially have major ramifications on the broadcast of power by the SFG.
This means that Turkey has become one of the most significant actors
in the calculations of Somali politicians.28
Given Turkey’s significant investment and political leverage in
Somalia, Turkey had many reasons to desire the reelection of Hassan Sheikh. The president’s favoritism towards Turkey in the form of
lucrative contracts was itself a byproduct of Turkey’s unilateral, highly
personal, and coordinated approach to Somalia.29 Turkey’s approach
included allegations of bribery and corruption that further enriched
Villa Somalia and resulted in Turkish firms winning control of Somalia’s two biggest revenue earners, the port and airport. Yet, the president’s desire to work with Turkey, as well as Qatar and Egypt (under
former president Mohamed Morsi), was reportedly driven by the reorientation of Somalia’s foreign policy away from IGAD and the African
Union towards the Muslim Brotherhood world preferred by his Damul
Jadiid allies and supporters.30 Perhaps most importantly, Qatari money
and support for his election as president swayed Hassan Sheikh to be
at least initially supportive of Doha’s foreign policy aims in Somalia, as
discussed in section IX.
Turkey’s support of Hassan Sheikh reportedly emanated less from
an affinity for the president and more from a wish for continuity and
continued access to the levers of Somali power and profit. Ankara realized that a change in leadership could also mean a change to their contracts. This is not without precedent, as Hassan Sheikh’s shady award
of the airport contract to the Turkish firm Favori, LLC – at the expense
of Dubai-based and South African-staffed SKA International Group –
could be performed by his successor with a resultant loss to Turkey.31
VII. Ethiopia
Ethiopia has played a critically powerful role in Somalia for over a
decade.32 It reportedly maintains a network of agents – including current and former SFG officials33 – and, according to former Ethiopian
Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, Ethiopian troops control up
to 60 percent of Somalia’s territory.34 While this may be an exaggeration, Ethiopia does maintain military control throughout much of the
country’s western and southern regions under the aegis of the regional
peacekeeping mission operated by the African Union (AU) with the
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approval of the United Nations, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).35 It is also the guarantor of the Jubbaland Compromise Agreement of 2013 that averted a rift between the Jubbaland
Administration and the SFG, but effectively means that Ethiopia plays
kingmaker in the state capital of Baidoa.36 Ethiopia also supports the
de-facto independent but unrecognized Republic of Somaliland, which
broke away from Mogadishu in 1991 and was instrumental in lobbying
the UAE’s DP World to sign a tripartite agreement with Ethiopia and
Somaliland for the Berbera Port. This deal effectively sidelined Mogadishu and makes the Balkanization of Somalia almost a fait accompli. “Simply put, a weak and fractured Somalia means that Ethiopia
can concentrate its attention and forces on quelling persistent internal
security difficulties and continuing to isolate and pressure [its arch
nemesis] Eritrea.”37 It can do so because Addis Ababa need no longer
fear a strong, unified Somalia, such as that under former president
Mohamed Siad Barre (1969-1991), which successfully fielded an invasion of Ethiopia during the Ogaden War (1977-1978). The advance of
SNA troops and those of the West Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) –
composed of ethnic Somalis living in the Ogaden in eastern Ethiopia were only repulsed after the Soviet Union and Cuba intervened on the
side of the embattled Marxist regime in Addis Ababa.38 The memory
of this near-defeat has informed Ethiopian foreign policy since then
and Ethiopia can be said to have taken advantage of the disintegration
of Somalia that has occurred as a result of the Somali Civil War. Thus,
while Ethiopia may annoy Mogadishu by its machinations in and support of the de-facto independent Republic of Somaliland, Mogadishu,
for example, can only fume at Ethiopia’s 19 percent stake in the Berbera
Port deal.39 However, it is important to remember that prior to official
anger (rather than anger on the street) in Mogadishu, the government
of Hassan Sheikh rubber-stamped the Berbera Port deal after reportedly receiving payments from Dubai and pressure from Ethiopia.40
Given Hassan Sheikh's pliant stance vis-à-vis this deal, his acceptance
of the Jubbaland Compromise Agreement and his penchant for being
swayed to support the position of the highest bidder, Ethiopia heavily
favored his reelection and maintenance of the status quo in Villa Somalia.41 When Hassan Sheikh lost the election to Farmajo, a populist who
unashamedly bashed Ethiopia in his campaign speeches, Ethiopian
powerbrokers were reportedly angered and stunned.42
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VIII. The United Kingdom
The UK, for reasons of expediency and political capital, wished, like
Turkey and Ethiopia, to see Hassan Sheikh remain in power. During
his tenure, powerful members of the UK government establishment,
to include former Conservative Party leader Lord Michael Howard of
Lympne CH, QC were instrumental in a deal signed in August 2013
between the London-based oil company, Soma Oil & Gas, and the SFG
to conduct seismic surveys. The deal reportedly involved the payment
of hundreds of thousands of dollars to key figures in the SFG by Soma
Oil & Gas in return for oil and gas exploration rights.43 Allegations of
serious fraud were raised by the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia
and Eritrea and the UK Serious Fraud Office (SFO) launched an investigation into the deal in mid-2015. The SFO dropped the investigation
in late 2016, even though “there were reasonable grounds to suspect
the commission of offences involving corruption.”44
UK citizens were also involved in the so-called Fishguard scandal
wherein Mauritius-registered Somalia-Fishguard Ltd., run by former
British army soldiers David Walker and Simon Falkner, was given the
rights to manage all aspects of Somalia’s fishing industry. This included
the issuance of fishing permits worth millions of dollars for the rights
to fish off Somalia’s lengthy coastline.45 According to one study, the
illegal foreign fishing taking place in Somalia’s territorial waters in
2015, for example, was worth an estimated $306 million a year.46
Numerous Britons have reportedly utilized their positions, or been
“deployed” from London, to influence and curry favor with Mogadishu. They furthered business contracts and organized conferences in
London in order to maintain British influence in the face of stiff competition from Turkey and Turkish businesses as well as to split Somalia
from certain Arab states, particularly those in the Gulf and Egypt, in
order to expand British economic and political influence by removing
competitors.47 These have included Hassan Sheikh’s PR advisor circa
2013, Richard Bailey, whose salary was reportedly paid by the UK’s
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO); Deborah (Bella) Bird, the
World Bank country director for Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan; and
Justin Marozzi, the former PR advisor to Prime Minister Abdi Farah
Shirdon. Louise Cottar, variously described as a Horn of Africa expert
and low-level advisor to the UN, was personally requested by Hassan Sheikh48 to act as a buffer between his administration and the UN
Monitoring Group for Somalia and Eritrea coordinated by Jarat Cho-
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pra, whose questions and subsequent report incensed Villa Somalia
and many powerful Britons alike.49
Perhaps the most visible and powerful role has been played by
Nicholas Kay, variously the head of the UN’s integrated mission to
Somalia (UNSOM) and the UN Special Representative of the Secretary
General (UN SRSG).50 The role these individuals played in concert
with London was described by one former Somalia government official as “… the most corrupt Europeans… I’ve ever come in contact
with.”51
Given the UK’s influence through individuals such as these, as well
as its donor contributions and powerful NGO and governmental overseas aid actors such as the Department for International Development
(DFID), it has supported initiatives in venues such as the UN that furthered its own agenda as well as those of Hassan Sheikh. For example,
the UK offered its support for a UN Security Council agreement to ease
a decades-old arms embargo in March 2013, despite serious concerns.52
IX. Qatar
Qatar has played a powerful role in Somalia’s politics for over a decade
despite its small size and population. However, Qatar’s foreign policy
impetus and objectives in Somalia are something of a black box. David
B. Roberts has argued that Qatar has consistently attempted to distance itself from the long shadow cast by Saudi Arabia.53 It has used
its 1992 defense cooperation agreement with the United States, which
allows the U.S. military use of Al Udeid Air Base as a tool to discourage any overt meddling by Saudi Arabia. At the same time, its rulers
have used the soft power tools at the disposal of their compact, uberhierarchical, oil-rich state to ensure its indispensability to multiple,
powerful states.54 Qatar’s role has annoyed its close neighbors from
time to time55 and alarmed regional actors who have borne the brunt
of Qatar’s mediation and peacekeeping efforts.56 However, its actions
in support of overt political Islamist actors across the Middle East,
particularly post-2011, have made Qatar’s position arguably untenable
as it reportedly lost control of the very Islamist actors it supported and
led directly to the ongoing Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) crisis, as
noted below.57
Regardless of the outcome, Qatar’s use of Islamists to further its
influence and distance its foreign policy from that of its neighbors is
one of the defining factors of its foreign policy. In the case of Somalia,
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Qatar’s role only began in 2006. Mohamed Hussein Gaas presciently
noted that prior to that time, Qatar possessed no local connections or
legitimacy.58 However, with the rise of the Union of Islamic Courts
(UIC), their short-lived rule and the subsequent atomization of Islamist
movements in Somalia, Qatar began to seriously engage with various
Islamist factions and former UIC members, attempting to influence
politics through personal and religious networks and, crucially, members of the Somali diaspora. “Often Qatar’s support [to its allies] was
via Islamist linkages. This reflected a certain practicality given existing
connections the Qatari elite had across the region. Equally, [Qatar’s
ruler] and his advisors were also content to support and empower a
broad range of Islamists, not least because they believed the time for
moderate Islam to play a role in regional politics had arrived. Consequently, they reasoned, supporting such a movement early on would
be a savvy political gamble for Qatar.”59 Indeed, influential diaspora
members reportedly negotiated the arrival of some of the UIC leadership, to include Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, to Qatar after Ethiopia invaded
Somalia and ended the UIC’s rule. Sheikh Sharif was feted in Doha
after his arrival in 2007, to include an interview with Al Jazeera.60
Sheikh Sharif was subsequently elected in 2009, possibly with the
assistance of significant Qatari funding, but fell out with Doha when
it insisted on expanding the government to include violent Islamists
such as Hassan Dahir Aweys and his Hisbul Islam. By 2012, Qatar had
dropped Sheikh Sharif in favor of a little-known academic, Hassan
Sheikh, who was promptly elected, reportedly with Fahad Yasin’s
assistance in the form of Qatari monetary support.61
During his tenure, Hassan Sheikh alienated himself from Fahad
Yasin and Qatar by refusing to appoint Farmajo, someone who both
Doha and their ally in Mogadishu, Fahad Yasin, assessed could influence Hassan Sheikh to make decisions in their favor. Doha withdrew
its support for Hassan Sheikh and instead supported Farmajo in the
2017 presidential election with money again couriered from Doha by
Fahad Yasin.62 Qatari money and Fahad Yasin’s organizational support proved absolutely critical to the outcome resulting in Farmajo’s
election. For example, Fahad Yasin reportedly recruited key defectors and insiders from Hassan Sheikh’s administration such as Hassan
Ali Kheyre, Thabit Mohamed, Jamal Mohamed Hassan, and Mustaf
Dhuxulow.63 From his base at the Jazeera Hotel in Mogadishu, Fahad
Yasin was reportedly provided with secret and sensitive information
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by these individuals that informed the timing and direction of bribery
payments to Somali politicians casting their votes.64
Interestingly, Qatar’s role in Somalia, given its role as kingmaker for
the past two presidents, remains largely invisible beyond money and
key Somali allies. This separates it from Turkey’s visible and overt role
of port and airport operator, military training facilitator, and its plethora of humanitarian and business actors operating in and around the
capital. Indeed, Turkey’s and Qatar’s roles in Somalia, while perhaps
complimentary by nature, have not until recently been so by design
despite divergent arguments and misleading hyperbole.65 Indeed, perceptions to the contrary that see Turkey’s and Qatar’s role in Somalia as
lock-step are informed by analysis and commentary on the GCC crisis
which erupted in June 2017. Pitting Qatar against the KSA, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt, developments in Somalia are viewed through the lens
of this crisis. Given that Qatar’s and Turkey’s involvement in Somalia began at different times and for very different reasons, they thus
should not be viewed as having always been (and perhaps not even
now) mutually constitutive or supportive.
X. Italy
Italy’s desire to affect change in Somalia can be said to be motivated
by a combination of colonial nostalgia,66 a desire to influence events
beyond Italy, control of offshore oil and gas blocks and, to a lesser
degree, making Somalia a stronger destination market for Italian
goods.67 To this end, Italy attempted to influence the 2017 election in
Somalia in its favor by leveraging its European Union (EU) role. Italy
was able to exert large amounts of control over EU policy vis-à-vis
Somalia because of its "colonial expertise" embodied in the role played
by Michele Cervone d'Urso, EU Special Envoy and first EU Ambassador for Somalia.68 Thus, by effectively guiding EU policy vis-à-vis
Somalia and directing the EU's significant financial aid in country, Italy
has punched above its weight both in Somalia and at international conferences and meetings on Somalia. It also reportedly has consistently
fed the EU information that was necessarily colored by Italian bias,
arguably influencing EU policy and priorities.69
Given its importance, leverage and gravitas, Italy attempted to
convince regional powers such as the UAE and Ethiopia that Hassan
Sheikh’s choice for Prime Minister, Omar Abdirashid Sharmarke was
a viable candidate.70 While there is little evidence that Italy’s choice of
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candidate ever held any sway in Addis Ababa it did play a role in Abu
Dhabi’s political calculations, as discussed in the next section. Italian
politicians reportedly liked Omar Abdirashid for two reasons. First, he
was not Hassan Sheikh and thus offered Italy a chance to reassert itself
within the ruling elite structure of Mogadishu, a role that had increasingly been swallowed up by Turkey over the course of Hassan Sheikh’s
tenure. Second, Omar Abdirashid likely supported Italian exploratory
oil blocks – granted by Kenya to Italian multinational oil and gas company ENI S.p.A. – off the coast of Somalia and Kenya.71 Evidence of
Italy’s favoritism for Omar was evidenced by a series of high-level
meetings in Rome and an official state visit with Italian Prime Minister
Matteo Renzi in May 2016. This dovetailed rather neatly with Renzi’s
public declaration to re-engage with Africa and ENI’s commitment to
invest $20 billion in Africa in the four years from 2016.72
Italy became increasingly concerned over the moves made by Hassan Sheikh’s administration to change the maritime border of Kenya
and Somalia. The government of Hassan Sheikh insisted that Somalia’s
maritime border with Kenya should be drawn in a southeasterly direction following the same line as the Kenya-Somalia border as it meets
the Indian Ocean (rather than stretching due east as Kenya insists).
When Somalia took Kenya to the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
in 2015,73 Italian politicians and oil interests were alarmed given ENI’s
outstanding blocks in the Indian Ocean were now in jeopardy should
the ICJ rule in favor of Somalia. As Fasil Amdetsion noted, “Perhaps
no Italian company better epitomizes opacity in its operations, and
intertwinement of state and corporate interests, than ENI… The Italian
government is a major shareholder in ENI, and ENI too has long had a
revolving door between its business and government.”74 Indeed, Renzi
baldly noted on national television “ENI is a fundamental component
of our energy policy, our foreign policy, our intelligence policy. By
intelligence, I mean our secret services.”75
Given the amount of state and industry collusion and deep fiscal and strategic interests offshore in the Horn of Africa region, Italy
threw its support to Omar Abdirashid. It did so because of the role he
had previously played as Prime Minister under the former TFG President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. During his tenure, Omar ordered
the then Minister of Planning and International Cooperation, Abdirahman Abdishakur Warsame to sign a controversial memorandum of
understanding (MoU) with Kenya. This MoU reportedly renounced
Somalia’s claims to the now contested maritime border by affirming
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the status quo. Indeed, Kenya has pointed strategically to this MoU as
proof of its sovereignty over the disputed areas when it awarded contracts to ENI and other oil majors accordingly.76 Thus, Italy’s desire to
maintain the maritime status quo led directly to their support of Omar.
XI. The United Arab Emirates (UAE)
The UAE reportedly tried to influence Somalia’s presidential election
but ultimately failed in its bid to locate a suitable candidate. The UAE’s
support for Somalia, particularly in the humanitarian and development arenas, as well as its efforts in fighting terrorism, has played an
important, if relatively minor role for over one decade.77 However, its
role is not without controversy. The UAE was reportedly responsible
for paying the salaries of at least some units of the Somali National
Army (SNA) from late 2015 until early 2018.78 Yet allegations of nonpayment to SNA officers and staff date to late 2015. As one anti-corruption report noted in early 2017, “Salary payments for most units
of the Somali National Army (SNA) were discontinued in late 2015;
although, until mid-2016, some units continued receiving stipends that
was [sic] not paid for by the Somali government…”79 According to the
report, “The reason for non-payment of salaries is not because of a lack
of money – tax collections are at $180M p/a according to the former
state minister of finance – but because of the elections. State resources,
including taxes and public property that was sold off, were plundered
in order to finance members of the ruling party running for parliament, and the president’s own election.”80 This leads to the assumption
that either a) the UAE delivered the money to the SFG for payment of
the SNA’s salaries but that it was stolen by the SFG, or b) that the UAE
did not deliver the money, or c) that the UAE reached a deal with the
SFG whereby the funds earmarked for the SNA were utilized for other
purposes. Of the three scenarios, the first seems the most plausible
given reports that SNA salaries were actually paid by a third party in
2016.
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Figure 2: “The political fate of Somalia.” Somali opposition figures, to
include Omar Abdirashid (on his knees, third from left), flock to the UAE
ȱȱȱ¢ǯȱȱȱÂȱȱȱ ȱ
Sheikh in his arms and attempts to bring Ethiopia (far right) along. Source:
Adapted from Amin Arts by Amin Amir: http://www.aminarts.com/

Regarding the 2017 presidential elections, the UAE initially supported
the incumbent but reportedly offered parallel support to former TFG
president Sheikh Sharif81 before switching, circa October 2016 and
based on Italian advice, to another individual they deemed a more
viable candidate, then-current Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Ali
Sharmarke. Abu Dhabi’s interest in electing Omar Abdirashid was
reportedly threefold. One, by removing Hassan Sheikh from power,
Qatar’s influence and that of the Muslim Brotherhood – in the form of
the Turkish AK Party and Hassan Sheikh’s Damul Jadiid – would be
minimized.82 Two, a new president, pliant to the wishes of and reliant on the UAE, would potentially abrogate existing agreements with
Turkey thereby paving the way for UAE-based firms such as DP World
and SKA to claim (or reclaim) the port and airport, respectively.83
Three, there are indications that pressure from the UAE’s ambassador
to Somalia, Mohammed Ahmed Othman Al Hammadi, led to Omar’s
designation as a viable and suitably pliant candidate.84 Operating from
Nairobi, the ambassador may have developed a positive impression of
Omar Abdirashid because of his position and resulting patronage network as Prime Minister, his previous position as Prime Minister under
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TFG President Sheikh Sharif and, importantly, by Italian support for
Omar Abdirashid’s candidacy.85
The UAE became so interested in Omar that they invited him
and approximately 20 other Somali politicians to Abu Dhabi in late
October 2016 in an effort to galvanize support for Omar’s presidential bid through the distribution of money.86 Yet rather than returning to Somalia and attempting to construct a viable electoral strategy
around Omar, the politicians (and Omar) reportedly pocketed the
money for their own personal use and political endeavors.87 After
this failure, Abu Dhabi reportedly reverted to their dual-track support of both Hassan Sheikh and Sheikh Sharif. While this strategy
may appear schizophrenic, it was indicative of the UAE’s attempts
to hedge and balance in the face of an uncertain electoral outcome in
order to maintain and possibly grow the UAE’s limited influence, and
to wring electoral promises from both candidates in favor of the UAE.
For example, during the election Hassan Sheikh referred to the UAE
as a “permanent strategic ally” and pledged he would “ensure that
relationship between the two countries flourish to the maximum if he’s
re-elected.”88
By investing in Hassan Sheikh, in particular, the UAE hoped to prise
the winning candidate away from Turkey and Qatar and make him
their man in Mogadishu. With the benefit of hindsight however, the
UAE’s choice of candidates appears to have been flawed and unduly
influenced by Italian prognostications. Omar Abdirashid, Hassan
Sheikh and Sheikh Sharif were all known quantities in Somalia having all spent time in office marred by allegations of corruption and
score-settling. They were therefore unpopular on the street as well as
with donors. While this would not normally make much difference
in a closed and patently unfair election, the 2017 election was conducted against the backdrop of significant anger against the perceived
excesses of Hassan Sheikh and his regime, and populist language by
candidates such as Farmajo aimed at foreign influence and meddling,
particularly Ethiopian, proved a powerful mobilizer.
XII. The United States
The elephant in the Somalia election room was the United States. The
feeling among many Somali politicians and diaspora stakeholders just
prior to the 2017 election was that should the US get involved behind
one candidate or a group of candidates, Hassan Sheikh’s days in office
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would quickly be over. The US had many reasons to dislike Hassan
Sheikh, to include US anger at unsavory deals done with UK politicians and businesses such as Soma,89 rampant corruption at Villa
Somalia, and alleged collusion with al-Shabaab. Yet US Somalia policy
was and remains hamstrung by multiple variables, with two factors
reigning supreme. First, the US does not really have a Somalia policy beyond security and the provision of security-related aid. This is
largely motivated by what could be termed the Horn of Africa counterterrorism soup du jour: al-Shabaab. Second, the 2016 US election
introduced a high degree of uncertainty into an already moribund and
second-tier US foreign policy imperative. With the election of Donald
Trump and confusion over administration priorities, US policies and
strategies in a corner of Africa that many in Washington would prefer
to forget were further de-emphasized. US ambassadors to Somalia,
from their base in Nairobi, have failed to achieve much leverage in
Mogadishu.90 US government day-to-day operations in Somalia have
similarly been handicapped by personnel leaving their posts citing
frustration and personal reasons.91 They also seem to have curried little
traction with certain members of the SFG who pejoratively referred
to former US Political Counselor for Somalia Affairs Bob Patterson
as “simplistic” and former US Political Counselor for Somalia Affairs
Cheryl Sim as the “loud American.”92 Given electoral uncertainty and
a lack of continuity in both policy and personnel, America’s interest in
the outcome of the 2017 election was low.
XIII. Conclusion
Much has been made of the outsider status of Farmajo, a reputation
that he and his allies, notably Fahad Yasin, broadcast effectively to the
electorate on the street. Yet it is important to highlight that Farmajo is a
known quantity inside Somalia and with the Somali diaspora. Farmajo
returned to Somalia and served briefly as Prime Minister in 2010 under
President Sheikh Sharif.93 According to some reports Farmajo appears
to have carried out his brief tenure well, reportedly paying overdue stipends to government soldiers and requiring cabinet members disclose
their assets.94 Yet this is contradicted by Abdirazak Fartaag’s detailed
report demonstrating Farmajo’s shady financial dealings with Sheikh
Sharif and other government officials while in office, thus tarnishing
his “clean hands” image.95 Despite his corrupt practices while in office,
Farmajo did resign in mid-2011 in protest over what he saw as politi-
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cal machinations by Sheikh Sharif to remain in power. His resignation
was met with street protests in Mogadishu and in cities with diaspora
populations such as Toronto.96 Bucking the trend for most Somali politicians, Farmajo left office relatively popular, thus helping his chances
in 2017.97
Farmajo was considered a viable candidate simply because the other
main candidates with real chances of election, Sheikh Sharif and Omar
Abdirashid, were considered almost as toxic as Hassan Sheikh. Their
viability depended almost entirely on clan political calculations and
their ability to bribe voters. In the case of Hassan Sheikh, his access to
money via the SFG as well as counting on the support of Turkey, Ethiopia and the UK made him the candidate to beat. But Hassan Sheikh
had his weaknesses. He was notoriously and publicly corrupt, thus
earning the ire of the Somali street. Additionally, he had incurred the
wrath of certain powerful members of his own sub-clan.
The fact that Farmajo was not Hassan Sheikh is one of the compelling reasons he may have won the final vote for president. But it is
not the only reason. The Somali street, as discussed, played a role in
the election, but only insofar as channeling votes away from Hassan
Sheikh and other candidates with track records in power and in voicing their opposition to Ethiopian meddling in Somalia affairs. Farmajo’s populism and his verbal barbs aimed at both corrupt SFG ministers
and Ethiopian powerbrokers in Somalia met with approval inside and
outside Somalia, drawing as they did on grievances that cross clan and
gender lines. Yet the men and women of Mogadishu, Barawe, Garowe
and Kismayo did not vote, of course. That was left up to the men
of power and privilege at the voting hall inside Mogadishu’s Airport
compound. And while evidence seems to demonstrate that they did
heed popular calls for an end to overt Ethiopian meddling in Somali
affairs by voting for Farmajo, the anti-Ethiopian candidate, their votes
were cast based on the amount of money candidates could deliver and
this depended, to a large degree, on how involved and supportive outside powers chose to be in relation to the election.
Hassan Sheikh’s election war chest dwarfed the other candidates –
even Farmajo’s with his access to Qatari money via Fahad Yasin. However, Hassan Sheikh reportedly had miscalculated by not paying the
salaries of various civil servants over the preceding years, thus costing him the support of key members of parliament and other voting
members. Farmajo was able to count on Qatar’s financial and political
support as well as Fahad Yasin’s organizational acumen at a critical
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juncture.98 Turkey remained overtly neutral throughout the process
and there is no indication that Ankara provided money directly to
Hassan Sheikh specifically for his reelection. Ethiopia remained convinced that Hassan Sheikh would prevail given his incumbency and
material power, but gravely miscalculated. The UK, in the person of
Michael Keating managed over $6 million in funds to assist in registration and other expenses, but London appears to have either been
caught off guard by Farmajo’s chances or, more likely, their fears were
assuaged by the promise that Hassan Ali Khaire—a dual Somali and
Norwegian citizen, former regional director for the Norwegian Refugee Council, and executive director for Africa for Soma Oil and Gas—
would be chosen as Farmajo’s Prime Minister.99 The US possessed the
clout and resources to have significantly affected the 2017 elections in
Mogadishu but, as noted, remained mired in its own presidential race
and the uncertainty that accompanied the election of Donald Trump.
Italy failed in its choice to significantly influence the direction and
choices of Villa Somalia when it threw its support to Omar Abdirashid,
yet it is doubtful that Rome would have offered the amounts of money
to Omar that wealthier actors such as Qatar were offering to their candidates.100 Italy's choice of candidate also affected the UAE's political
calculations vis-à-vis Somalia. This has had some serious implications
for Abu Dhabi's foreign policy in the Horn of Africa where the GCC
crisis appears to be playing out in worrisome detail. The Berbera Port
deal between Ethiopia, the de-facto independent Republic of Somaliland and DP World reportedly incensed powerful interests in Mogadishu who view Somalia as a unitary state and one that should be ruled
from Mogadishu. That Qatar's choice of candidate, Farmajo as well as
their man in Mogadishu, Fahad Yasin now occupy Villa Somalia has
only complicated matters and some see the hand of Qatar and possibly Turkey in the April 2018 SFG's seizure of UAE diplomatic cargo
worth over $9 million and the resulting rupture in diplomatic relations
between the UAE and Somalia. If this is indeed the case, nothing better demonstrates the importance and the grave consequences of rising
powers jockeying for position in the Horn of Africa.
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